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ABSTRACT: Properties and facts play a central role within metaphysics, yet there is 
no widely accepted account of what constitutes a property or a fact. Traditional 
conceptions of these metaphysical notions raise serious philosophical puzzles, 
making the existence of each seem dubious. Drawing on the minimalist theory of 
truth, I argue in favor of a minimalist conception of properties and facts. A mini-
malist theory of properties and facts explains these matters in terms of the accept-
ance of trivial schemas. To make the case that minimalism is a superior approach 
to properties and facts, I argue against the standard views in the philosophical 
literature. I argue that the minimalist approach to properties has advantages over 
realism, nominalism, and the trope theory. I argue that the minimalist approach 
to facts is superior to the standard treatment of facts on correspondence theories. 
Metaphysical minimalism, a minimalist metaphysics of properties and facts, is a 
distinct and superior alternative to the theories of properties and facts currently 
on offer.
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The minimalist theory of truth, developed and defended by Horwich 
(1998), holds that the notion of truth is best understood in terms of a trivial 
schema. For any proposition p, the following truth schema holds:
Truth Schema: <p>1 is true if, any only if, p.
Contrary to inflationary approaches to truth such as the correspondence 
theory, pragmatism, and pluralism, no further explanation of truth is re-
quired according to minimalism beyond this trivial schema. I will argue 
that a similar kind of minimalism is the best approach to two central no-
tions in metaphysics: properties and facts. Given the failures of traditional 
1 <p> shall be used throughout the article as a shorthand for “The proposition that p”.
40 Prolegomena 10 (1) 2011
approaches to properties and facts, there is a strong case to be made in 
favor of minimalism not only about truth, but also about metaphysics.
Properties
There is no single, universally accepted view among philosophers about 
the nature of properties. Three of the paradigmatic theories of the nature 
of properties are platonism, nominalism, and the trope theory.2 The cen-
tral positive issue theories of properties such as platonism and the trope 
theory are intended to address is the issue in virtue of what is a certain 
object with a property F an object with such a property. In virtue of what 
are all chairs objects that have the property of being chairs, and in virtue 
of what are all persons objects that have the property of being persons? 
When we have two dogs, Fido and Spot, and both dogs have the property 
of being dogs, how is it that these two different animals have one and the 
same property? This problem is the traditional “one over many” problem 
posed by Plato.3
To understand fully the various commitments of the philosophical 
theories of properties, it is useful to appeal to Keith Campbell’s way 
of characterizing these views. Campbell appeals to the distinction be-
tween entities that are universal and those that are particular, and also to 
the further distinction between entities that are abstract and those that 
are concrete. Keeping these two distinctions separate is quite impor-
tant. Entities are universals if they are “unrestricted in the plurality of 
different locations in space-time at which they may be wholly present” 
(Campbell 1981: 477). A particular, unlike a universal, can only be at 
a certain place at a certain time. Abstract entities are those “got before 
the mind by abstraction, that is, by concentrating attention on some, but 
not all, of what is presented” (ibid., 478). No such process of abstrac-
tion is required in order to consider a concrete object, like a table, chair, 
book, or computer. To think of the whiteness of the computer, however, 
or the hardness of the table, one must concentrate on these particular 
aspects. 
The platonist theory postulates the existence of abstract universal ob-
jects, a property (in the case of Fido and Spot) of being a dog, which all 
objects that have this property exemplify. There is a single entity that is 
2 Proponents of Platonism include Plato (1997) and Frege (1997). Devitt (1980) has 
argued for the nominalist view I discuss in this article. Trope theorists include Campbell 
(1981) and Williams (1953).
3 Plato (1997) and Armstrong (1978) have appealed to this argument in order to make 
a case for universals. Quine (1948) and Devitt (1980) have argued that the one over many 
does not present a convincing case for the existence of universals. 
41F. J. MCDONALD: Metaphysical Minimalism
the property F, and this universal F is exemplified by all objects that are 
F. In addition to individual concrete chairs, there is an individual abstract 
object that is the property of being a chair. It is the relationship between 
the abstract object of being a chair and the individual chairs that is sup-
posed to explain why it is that all chairs are chairs. 
The trope theory differs from platonism insofar as it is, unlike nomi-
nalism, committed to the existence of properties but not to the existence 
of abstract universals. Rather, the trope theorist holds that properties are 
abstract particulars. There is not a single abstract object, the property of 
being a chair, which accounts for why all chairs are chairs. Instead, each 
chair is supposed to contain an instance of a trope of chairhood, which is 
some part of the chair. All of the other aspects of the chair – its hardness, 
its being made of wood, its shape – are also tropes, and the chair itself is a 
collection of these tropes.
The nominalist theory balks at the postulation of either of these sorts 
of abstract entities, abstract universals or abstract particulars, and claims 
that there are no such things as properties. Instead, there are only predi-
cates and objects. The proper approach is to eschew talk of an object hav-
ing the property of being F, and just to note that the object is F. There is 
nothing to say over and above the predication of “F” of the object. As 
Michael Devitt has noted, the nominalist offers an answer to the question 
of the one over many problem, “In virtue of what are a and b both F?” 
The answer given by the nominalist is simply that this is true in virtue of 
the following:
(1) a is F;
(2) b is F (Devitt 1980: 95).
As Devitt notes, this cannot be all there is to be said regarding properties 
on a adequate nominalist account, for there are a number of meaningful 
expressions purportedly referring to properties that cannot be explained 
by claims such as (1) and (2) alone, such as “humility is a virtue”.
Many disputes in metaphysics are cast in terms of denials of the exist-
ence of a given property. Secondary quality theorists deny the existence 
of objective colors. Atheists deny the existence of certain religious prop-
erties, such as grace. Moral antirealists deny that moral properties exist. 
How are we supposed to read any claim denying the existence of a prop-
erty? The trouble is that it seems that one needs to appeal to one or another 
of these philosophical theories of properties in order to cash out this denial 
of existence, and doing so will require becoming entangled in this debate 
over the nature of properties.
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Take, for example, the nominalist theory. The nominalist denies that 
there are properties.4 Instead, there are only predicates and objects to 
which predicates apply. If this is correct, then as Devitt (2002) points out, 
the nominalist is automatically committed to denying the existence of any 
property whatsoever. Denial of the existence of a given class of proper-
ties is just a particular instance of the nominalist’s general position on the 
nonexistence of properties.
On the other hand, if we are to understand positions that claim proper-
ties do indeed exist, then we would have to appeal to either the platonist 
theory or the trope theory in order to fully spell out what this commitment 
amounts to. It is far from clear, however, that all of those who accepted that 
a contested class of properties – such as objective colors, religious proper-
ties, or moral properties – genuinely do exist would also be comfortable 
claiming that there are either abstract universals or abstract particulars. 
One could coherently imagine a philosopher being perfectly comfortable 
claiming redness, grace, or goodness exists without feeling particularly at-
tracted to either platonism or the trope theory. For these reasons, as noted 
above, assertion or denial of the existence of any sort of properties would 
be tangled into these vexed issues.
A Deflationary Account of Properties
All three of the traditional accounts of properties discussed above are 
deeply unsatisfying, and each results in either regarding the existence of 
properties as a mysterious matter or revising our ordinary practice of at-
tributing properties.5 The platonist makes it difficult to understand how 
it is even possible that objects could have properties. We are driven to a 
philosophical paradox by the account given of the relationship between 
objects and properties. If having a property, and being in a relation, are 
explained by the postulation of properties and relations, then we will need 
to account for the relation that binds the property to the object. The trouble 
that presents itself is that this relation of exemplification, the relation that 
binds property to object, itself stands in need of explanation. Postulation 
4 The term “nominalist” is sometime used in a broader sense, to mean not the view 
that denies the existence of properties, but only a view that denies the existence of univer-
sals. In this broader sense, the trope theory is considered a form of nominalism. In order 
to keep all of the terminology of this article clear, I am only using the term “nominalist” in 
the narrow sense I have spelled out here.
5 The criticism of the traditional account of properties in indebted to Wittgenstein’s 
(1953) account of philosophical problems in the Philosophical Investigations, and to dis-
cussions with Paul Horwich of Wittgenstein’s metaphilosophy.
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of a further relation to relate property, object, and exemplification will 
result in infinite regress, a philosophical paradox.6
The trope theorist, on the other hand, presents a view that is deeply 
revisionary of our ordinary view both of properties and objects. We would 
normally say that there is only a single property of being a dog, or a single 
property of being a table. On this view, however, there are many proper-
ties of being a dog, as many properties of being a dog as there are dogs. 
Where there is a dog, there is a trope of being a dog. Perhaps even more 
difficult to understand is the position of trope theorist on the existence of 
objects. For Campbell, the basic kind of entity is a trope, and objects are 
collections of such tropes.
On the view that tropes are the basic particulars, concrete particulars, the 
whole man and the whole piece of cloth, count as dependent realities. They 
are collections of co-located tropes, depending on these tropes as a fleet does 
upon its component ships (Campbell 1981: 479).
Thus the trope theorist makes even ordinary objects such as tables and 
chairs seem obscure and mysterious. What exactly are the tropes that a 
chair consists of? Where does one trope end and the other begin? How do 
all of these tropes “hang together”?
The nominalist, in reaction to the mysteries presented by the views 
of the trope theorist and the platonist, denies the existence of properties 
altogether. This denial, unless supplemented with an account of ordinary 
talk, fails to make sense of our ordinary discussion of properties. Devitt 
correctly notes that:
We all assent to, express, believe statements like the following:
…Red resembles orange more than it resembles blue;
…Red is a colour;
…He has the same virtues as his father;
…The dresses were of the same colour.
…[T]hese statements seem to require the existence of properties for them to 
be true (Devitt 1980: 99).
Without, as Devitt notes, a method for paraphrasing ordinary talk of pro-
perties, the truth of these statements is left unexplained. 
Consider, for example, the claim that humility is a virtue.7 One might 
consider paraphrasing this claim without a reference to the property of 
humility as follows:
6 There is a vast literature on this regress problem. The regress problem was first 
noted by Plato himself in the Parmenides (1997). A recent presentation of the regress 
problem as a serious issue for theories of properties is Lewis (1983). 
7 I am grateful to Borut Cerkovnik for discussion of this issue.
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All humble persons are virtuous persons.
This paraphrase would fail to properly convey the proper meaning of 
“humility is a virtue”. Assume, for the sake of argument, that humility is 
a virtue. It is not the case, even if humility is a virtue, that all humble per-
sons are virtuous persons. An individual who is only humble, yet has no 
other redeeming qualities, would not be a virtuous person. The paraphrase 
of this claim miscasts the relationship between humility and virtue. The 
claim that humility is a virtue states a relation among properties: humility 
is one of the properties that belong to the class of virtue properties. Talk of 
properties allows us to make meaningful statements of this sort.
The error that is at the source of all of these various theories of prop-
erties is an error of the sort that Wittgenstein noted in the Philosophical In-
vestigations as characteristic of philosophical perplexities. Each of these 
positions results from thinking of properties as being analogous to con-
crete objects, and expecting talk of properties to function in a way similar 
to discussion of concrete objects. This is a result of the use of noun phrases 
such as “the property of being blue” or “the color of this computer” in dis-
cussing properties. When we talk of the property P as being a thing that in 
virtue of which certain objects have the property P, or share the property 
P, we are misled into thinking that there is some explanatory relationship 
between something similar to a concrete object, the property P, and the 
things that have this property. The platonist is led by thinking of properties 
in this way to make the relation between objects and properties mysteri-
ous. The trope theorist makes ordinary objects themselves puzzling. The 
nominalist avoids these troubles by denying the existence of properties 
but as a result cannot capture of our ordinary talk of properties.
Is there an account of the notion of property that accords better with 
our ordinary linguistic practice? Is there some noncontroversial account of 
properties to which we could turn in order to characterize disagreements 
over ontology? If we were to attempt to characterize the use of the term 
“property” in ordinary, nonphilosophical contexts, we would find that there 
is little difference between attributing a property F to an object x and saying 
that x is F. Is there a circumstance in which we would say that water has the 
property of being wet, but deny that water is wet? Is there a circumstance in 
which we would say that Barack Obama has the property of being a Demo-
crat, but deny that Barack Obama is a Democrat? These entailments work 
in the opposite direction as well: There is little room for saying that Susan 
is a redhead but denying that Susan has the property of being a redhead.
Noting this uncontroversial fact regarding the notion of property, we 
can characterize our use of the term “property” by the following schema, 
suggested by Horwich:
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For any object x, x has the property of being F if and only if x is F. (Horwich 
1993: 74)
There is little room, if properties are understood in this sense, for disagree-
ment over whether a certain property is being attributed to an object by 
a speaker. For, whenever a speaker predicates F of an object, it just trivi-
ally follows that this speaker is attributing the property of being F to that 
object.8
Seeing that this is the notion of property employed in ordinary con-
texts, we once again see where the three traditional accounts of properties 
discussed above went wrong. The platonist and trope theorist led to theo-
ries that made the relationship between objects and properties, or objects 
themselves obscure due to the feeling that there was a deep mystery regard-
ing how a certain object could have a property F. The nominalist denies the 
existence of properties for the same reason: Given that properties are so 
mysterious, and the only way to account for this mystery is to postulate the 
existence of a strange sort of object, properties must not exist at all.
In order to avoid confusion, it should be noted that the minimalist ac-
count of properties is not a nominalist view – it is a view that, like platonism, 
holds that there are properties. Unlike platonism, the minimalist account 
claims that there is nothing further of significance to be said about the onto-
logy of properties beyond what is spelled out by the trivial property schema. 
It is through the use of this schema to talk about properties that the minimal-
ist account is able to avoid the problems that plagued the nominalist regard-
ing statements quantifying over properties (such as “humility is a virtue”).
Facts
Certain traditional versions of the correspondence theory of truth have 
defined true propositions (or utterances) as those propositions (or utter-
ances) that correspond to the facts. This characterization is incomplete. In 
order to complete the theory, the correspondence theorist would have to 
tell us what a fact is. Is it some sort of object? In what way does this object 
resemble, or correspond, to a proposition? Is a fact some sort of (in J. L. 
Austin’s phrase) “linguistic Doppelgänger” (Austin 1950: 123)?
8 As noted above, the account of properties presented here is due to Horwich (1993). 
A similar account of properties is discussed by Stephen Schiffer in his book The Things We 
Mean. According to Schiffer, “It is a conceptual truth that if Lassie is a dog, then Lassie 
has the property of being a dog” (Schiffer 2003: 61). I find Schiffer’s characterization of 
properties as “pleonastic entities” secured by “something-from-nothing” transitions a bit 
misleading. The point is not that properties are created or brought into existence by appeal 
to the minimalist property schema. Rather, as with truth, the point is that it is a mistake to 
say anything about properties over and above what is stated by this schema. 
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Is there any need to posit the existence of these kinds of facts as ob-
jects over and above the concrete objects we are already familiar with? 
As Quine (1960) points out, the sentences “Fifth Avenue is six miles 
long” and “Fifth Avenue is a hundred feet wide” would presumably be 
made true by different facts on the correspondence theory. However, in 
order to explain fully what makes such sentences true, we need not posit 
entities such as facts over and above objects. We can account for the 
truth of these sentences in terms of a single, more familiar object – Fifth 
Avenue:
Our two sentences last quoted are true because of Fifth Avenue, because it 
is a hundred feet wide and six miles long, because it was planned and made 
that way, and because of the way we use our words; only indirection re-
sults from positing facts, in the image of sentences, as intermediaries (Quine 
1960: 247).
Thus it seems that facts, as traditionally conceived of by the correspond-
ence theorist, are both obscure and theoretically unnecessary.
One way of making the notion of a fact less obscure would be to 
think of facts as a kind of composite, made up of objects and properties. 
The trouble with thinking of facts in this way is that it fails to offer a fully 
comprehensive account of facts. There are true statements that are true 
even though the truths that they state are not related to any specific prop-
erty or objects. As Strawson (1950) points out in his criticism of Austin’s 
(1950) defense of the correspondence theory of truth, the theory of facts as 
composite objects only works for a restricted set of examples, such as the 
fact that the cat is on the mat. This fact might be thought of as composed 
of the cat and its relation to the mat, but such a composite object does not 
exist for every true statement.
…[F]acts of the cat-on-the-mat-type are the favoured species for adherents 
of Mr. Austin’s type of view….Other species of fact, however, have long 
been known to present more difficulty: the fact that the cat is not on the 
mat, for example, or the fact that there are white cats, or that cats persecute 
mice, or that if you give my cat an egg, it will smash it and eat the contents 
(Strawson 1950: 467)
There are no plausible candidates for the objects and properties that would 
be the components of these facts noted by Strawson. Consider as well 
examples of facts regarding the nonexistence of entities, such as the fact 
that there are no unicorns. What entity would be the object that is a com-
ponent of such a fact? To avoid the postulation of unicorns, an alternative 
approach to facts is required. A better theory of facts would allow for ne-
gations, generalizations, and denials of existence to state facts.
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An argument due to Frege (1918–19), Gödel (1944), Church (1956), 
Davidson (1984), and Neale (2001) raises a further, serious difficulty for 
proponents of any version of the correspondence theory spelled out in 
terms of facts.9 This argument is often called the “slingshot argument”. 
If, according to the slingshot argument, a statement is made true by cor-
responding to a particular fact, then all true statements are made true by 
corresponding to the same fact. Instead of there being individual, distinct 
facts that make different statements true, there could only be one fact, in 
Davidson’s term, “The Great Fact”.
The slingshot argument, as Davidson presents it,10 is based on the fol-
lowing two assumptions: (1) If a sentence S1 corresponds to a certain fact 
F, then any logically equivalent sentence S2 that we substitute for S1 will 
correspond to the same fact F; (2) If a sentence S1 corresponds to a certain 
fact F, then the substitution of a singular term T1 (contained in S1) for a 
coextensive singular term T2 will yield a sentence S2 that corresponds to 
the same fact F.
Take as our example of a statement that happens to “correspond to a 
fact” the true sentence S1:
S1: The Yankees won the 1998 World Series.
By assumption, this statement is made true by the fact that the Yankees 
won the 1998 World Series. Appealing to assumption 1, if we substitute 
for S1 the sentence S2, which is logically equivalent to S1, we have sub-
stituted a sentence that corresponds to the same fact F.
S2: (the x such that x is identical with George W. Bush and S1) is 
identical with (the x such that x is identical with George W. Bush)
Given that S1 is identical in truth value with sentence S3,
S3: The Red Sox won the World Series in 1918.
we can substitute S3 for S1 in sentence S2 without changing the reference 
of the singular term in the subject position. Thus, appealing to assumption 
2, we see that S4 corresponds to the same fact as the fact to which both S2 
and S1 correspond:
S4: (the x such that x is identical with George W. Bush and S3) is 
identical with (the x such that x is identical with George W. Bush).
 9 The most comprehensive defense of the slingshot argument is Stephen Neale’s 
Facing Facts (2001).
10 The following formulation of the slingshot argument is based on the formulation 
in Davidson (1967).
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Given that S4 is logically equivalent to S3, we can make another appeal 
to assumption 1 to establish that S3 corresponds to the same fact as S4, as 
well as the same fact to which S1 and S2 correspond.
To reiterate, the argument is as follows:
SS1: S1 corresponds to fact F (assume for the sake of reductio)
SS2: S2 corresponds to fact F (SS1, assumption 1)
SS3: S4 corresponds to fact F (SS2, assumption 2)
SS4: S3 corresponds to fact F (SS3, assumption 1)
Thus, if S1, “The Yankees won the World Series in 1998” and S3, “The 
Red Sox won the World Series in 1918” are made true by corresponding 
to a fact F, they are made true by corresponding to the very same fact. 
Repeated appeals to this line of argument would establish Davidson’s con-
clusion that, if statements are made true by corresponding to facts, then all 
statements correspond to one and the same “Great Fact”.
Davidson takes the moral of this argument to be that we should reject 
philosophical theories spelled out in terms of facts: “The strategy of facts, 
against which I have been inveighing, is something else: a philosophi-
cal theory, and a bad one” (Davidson 1984: 50). Quine and Davidson are 
not the only philosophers whose views lead them to rejection of talk of 
facts. Other versions of the correspondence theory of truth, such as the 
version of Tarski’s theory proposed by Field (1972), make no appeal to 
facts in order to explain the relationship between language and the world. 
As Davidson (1984) points out, if the Tarskian theory of truth is correct, a 
full definition of truth can be given by appeal to principles regarding the 
denotation of referring terms and the satisfaction of predicates. No appeal 
to facts is required on such an account.
Non-correspondence inflationary theories of truth including the prag-
matist theory and the coherence theory also seem to require no appeal to 
this correspondence notion of facts. For example, if true propositions are 
defined as propositions that are useful to believe, then we need not make 
any appeal to facts in order to explain the nature of truth. We need only 
appeal to an account of practice that will tell us which propositions are 
more or less useful. Also, none of the deflationary theories of truth makes 
appeal to the notion of a fact in explaining the role of the truth term. It 
would seem that the only theory of truth that gives facts an essential role 
to play is the version of the correspondence theory that is susceptible to 
the slingshot argument. Should we then follow Quine and Davidson in 
rejecting facts tout court?
Davidson’s counsel to regard talk of facts as part of a useless philo-
sophical theory overlooks that talk of facts, in ordinary contexts, serves 
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important purposes. For example, we certainly wouldn’t want to follow 
the strategy of rejecting facts to the absurd consequence of refusing to 
recognize as meaningful statements such as “Voters will decide in this 
election based on the facts on the ground in Iraq”, or “Successful scientific 
theories are based on the observed facts”. Davidson seems to recognize 
this to some degree when he calls “talk of facts…harmless,” but he fails to 
offer any account of facts (Davidson 1984: 50).
A way to properly characterize the way the notion of fact is employed 
in ordinary contexts without making appeal to any strange, theoretically 
unnecessary entities is provided by a schema similar to the minimalist 
truth schema. Truth is characterized in terms of acceptance of instances of 
the following schema:
<p> is true if and only if p.
Whenever we accept that p, we also accept that it is true that p. It is also 
the case that whenever we recognize that a certain proposition, <p>, is 
true, we are inclined to claim that it is a fact that p. Given that it is true 
that electrons have negative charge, it is a fact that electrons have negative 
charge.11
Given that this is the case, we can characterize our notion of fact in 
terms of acceptance of the following schema:
That p is a fact if and only if p (Horwich 1993: 74).
We can appeal to this minimalist fact schema in order to see that the notion 
of fact plays a generalizing role similar to the generalizing role played by 
the notion of truth. Talk of the facts in a particular domain is a shorthand 
allowing us to refer to a number of true propositions without stating them 
one at a time. For instance, take the sentence “Voters will decide in this 
election based on the facts on the ground in Iraq”. What this means is that, 
for all propositions <p>, if <p> is a proposition regarding the current situ-
ation in Iraq, and it is a fact that p, then the voters will make decisions in 
the election based on the belief that p. By the equivalence schema, this 
amounts to the following: for all propositions <p>, if <p> is a proposition 
regarding the current situation in Iraq, and p, then the voters will make 
decisions in the election based on the belief that p.
11 That there is such a relationship between facts and true propositions should not 
lead us to think that facts are themselves true propositions. Propositions, as meanings of 
statements, are a different sort of entity entirely from facts. To talk about facts, generally, 
is not to talk about meanings. The fact that electrons have negative charge is not itself a se-
mantic entity, and it thus differs in kind from the meaning of the statement “electrons have 
negative charge”. The fact that electrons have negative charge is a fact regarding electrons 
and charge, not a fact regarding the meanings of “electron” and “charge”. I am grateful to 
Saana Hirvonen for raising this issue.
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The minimalist theory of also allows for the possibility of a fully com-
prehensive theory of facts. Given that facts are not thought of as compos-
ite objects, the minimalist theory of facts is not subject to the limitations 
that Strawson noted in Austin’s theory of facts. Each of the following is a 
legitimate instance of the minimalist fact schema:
SI1: That the cat is on the mat is a fact if and only if the cat is on the 
mat.
SI2: That the cat is not on the mat is a fact if and only if the cat is not 
on the mat.
SI3: That cats persecute mice is a fact if and only if cats persecute 
mice.
SI4: That there are no unicorns is a fact if and only if there are no 
unicorns.
Given that the minimalist account of facts does not consider facts as being 
composite objects, it can allow for the possibility of negations, generaliza-
tions, and denials of existence to state facts.
This alternative, minimalist account of facts allows us to properly 
characterize the notion of facts used in ordinary contexts as well as to 
diagnose the error that led to the conclusion of the slingshot argument. 
The presupposition of the correspondence theory that truth involves cor-
respondence to facts is rejected by deflationists generally, including the 
minimalist. A minimalist account of truth, by providing an account of truth 
that makes no appeal to correspondence to facts in its explanation of truth, 
is not damaged by the slingshot argument.
The trouble the slingshot presents for correspondence theories is that 
one cannot take the notion of fact to be an explanatory notion, one that 
plays an important role in a theory of truth, if the slingshot argument is 
successful. For how could correspondence to facts explain why certain 
statements are true, if it is the case that when any statement corresponds to 
a particular fact, it corresponds to all other facts as well? The minimalist 
account of truth and facts, in stark contrast, does not account for the truth 
of propositions in terms of a correspondence relation between proposi-
tions and facts. Thus the slingshot considerations regarding the relation of 
correspondence between statements and facts does not present any prob-
lem whatsoever for the minimalist account of truth and facts.
Truth, Properties, and Facts
There are parallels between the truth schema, the property schema, and 
the fact schema. Each allows for the formulation of general claims that 
could not be stated without appeal to such schemata. None of these sche-
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mata should be thought of as either introducing truth, properties, or facts 
into the world or eliminating truth, properties, or facts from the world.12 
Consider the schemata:
Truth schema: <p> is true if, and only if, p.
Property schema: For any object x, x has the property of being F if 
and only if x is F.
Fact schema: That p is a fact if and only if p.
Reading these biconditionals from the right hand side first (after the con-
nective), and then to the left hand side (prior to the connective), might 
suggest that these schemata serve the purpose of introducing truths, prop-
erties, and facts into the world. Reading these biconditionals from the left 
hand side first, and then to the right hand side, might suggest that these 
schemata serve the purpose of eliminating truths, properties, and facts 
from the world. Neither of these readings is correct. The minimalist sche-
mata are not stated for the purpose of eliminating truths, properties, or 
facts from the world. Truths, properties, and facts are indispensible for the 
purpose of making correct general statements about the world.
The minimalist schemata should also not be thought of as introduc-
ing truths, facts, or properties into the world. It is not due to these sche-
mata that the truths, facts, and properties exist. That it is true that grass is 
green; that grass has the property of being green; and that it is a fact that 
grass is green are all so because of the green grass and not because of the 
philosophical schemata themselves. These schemata simply allow for us 
to speak of what is and what is not.13
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